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Choosing Our Better History: 
Religion, Secularism, 
and American Public Life
Linell Cady
I am delighted for this opportunity to participate in the Macalester 
Civic Forum and to explore with you some “big” normative questions 
about our civic life. All too often academics feel constrained to dwell 
upon smaller questions—some say ever smaller questions—so I wel-
come this chance to think about the bigger picture.
I have been invited to reflect upon the question, “What should be the 
role of religion in contemporary American public life?” That certainly 
counts as a big question, and one that invariably touches a nerve. The 
very question, and its inflection, signals the conflicts, uncertainties, and 
anxieties surrounding religion in our current moment.
Religion has re-emerged as a problem, a problem most Americans 
in the 20th century thought they had pretty much solved by a wall of 
separation between our public life and private faiths. In recent decades, 
religious actors and movements have increasingly “gone public,” chal-
lenging the constitutional underpinnings and historical adequacy of 
the wall metaphor. Consensus about the place of religion in American 
life has unraveled, and we are less sure about the rules of the game.
Skirmishes over the place of religion in American public life have 
become regular features of our cultural landscape. In recent years, we 
have grown accustomed to religiously inflected disputes over abortion, 
sexuality, stem cell research, prayer in schools, religious symbolism in 
public spaces…and the list goes on. These are not isolated disputes 
with changing coalitions, but episodes in the so-called “culture wars” 
that have rocked American society for decades. Although most Ameri-
cans may stand on the sidelines of this struggle, its extreme camps 
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have spawned dueling public narratives over the place of religion in 
American life and identity—narratives that constitute the inescapable 
backdrop to our reflections on this topic.1
I. Dueling Public Narratives
One story recounts the emergence of a creeping secularism that has 
taken hold of American public life in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Framing secularism as another religion, this story mobilizes 
“people of faith” to fight back against the privatization and marginal-
ization of their voice in American life. The second narrative, essentially 
a mirror image of the first, traces a dangerously expansive conserva-
tive religious movement that is threatening to take down the secular 
consensus and values of our democratic public life. If the rhetorical 
power of the first story is driven by the idea of secularism as another 
religion, the second draws strength from hurling charges of impend-
ing theocracy at those religious discourses and movements seeking to 
transform secular American law and practices.2
To take just one example, consider the highly charged rhetoric 
surrounding the issue of gay marriage. Its legalization in California 
prompted religious conservatives to campaign vigorously last fall for 
Proposition 8, a ballot initiative to ban it. In an obvious effort to raise 
passions and the stakes, Donald Wildmon, a leading conservative 
Christian evangelical leader, announced that the culture war itself hung 
in the balance. If the proposition to prohibit gay marriage went down 
to defeat, he pronounced, “the culture war is over and Christians have 
lost” and “gradually, secularism will replace Christianity as the foun-
dation of our society.”3 Clearly designed to mobilize sympathizers, this 
intensified rhetoric succinctly captures the oppositional construction 
of religion and secularism that has anchored and fueled the religious 
right, a movement that has successfully institutionalized itself through 
media outlets, think tanks, and grassroots organizations.
Significantly, if not surprisingly, a similar oppositional rhetoric is 
deployed to very different ends by the opposing camp, especially evi-
dent in the spate of new books attributed to the “new atheists,” a 
group that includes such figures as Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and 
Christopher Hitchens.4 Aptly dubbed “missionary secularists,” these 
figures are waging a highly visible campaign to position religion as a 
dangerous, irrational force. Consider, for example, the efforts of Sam 
Harris in his book-length screed The End of Faith. In caricaturist fashion 
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he equates religion with superstition, irrationality, and violence against 
which he sets secularism, the font of reason, progress, and peace. Espe-
cially telling, for Harris one is either an enlightened secularist or a 
religious fundamentalist—there is no middle ground. A religious mod-
erate who imagines otherwise is really, he insists, a “failed fundamen-
talist.” Or if you want the short story, just note the subtitle of Hitchens’ 
book, How Religion Poisons Everything. You may be familiar with a far 
more entertaining variant of this position that has entered popular cul-
ture in the form of Bill Maher’s new movie Religulous, a neologism that 
blends religion and the ridiculous to obvious satirical ends.
I mention these antipodes of the culture wars, not to endorse either 
of these two approaches, but to take stock of the broader context within 
which we are located. Even if one does not align explicitly with either 
pole, their narratives now saturate our contemporary moment—thor-
oughly if not exclusively. In so doing, these stories inhabit us, shaping 
and constricting the imaginative repertoire through which we engage 
our world. The media has played a critical role in sustaining these 
story lines. To some extent this reflects their penchant for “conflict nar-
ratives” that help to generate interest and sales. But even beyond that 
it reflects, as Diane Winston has shown, the media’s embrace of a new 
framework for religion reporting. Throughout much of the 20th cen-
tury, refracting the legacy of the Scopes trial, the media story line was 
“true believers as fools” and scientists as “heroes.” This interpretive 
angle has kept substantive coverage of religion outside of mainstream 
secular media.5 Yet it also facilitated the dominance of a public Prot-
estantism, helping it to operate largely under the radar screen. Things 
have changed in the past few decades. Through the influence of the 
media-savvy religious right, we have seen the ascendancy of another 
news narrative “privileging culture wars and clashing civilizations,” 
which has allowed conservative religious voices to own religion in the 
public sphere.6 As a result, liberal and progressive religious voices and 
values have been largely eclipsed from the coverage and their presence 
in our imaginative repertoire correspondingly reduced—at least until 
recently. There are now some indications suggesting we have entered a 
transitional moment, which may be opening up new ways of envision-
ing and enacting the public role of religion.
As should be evident from this quick snapshot of the polarized 
landscape, it is impossible to think clearly about the role of religion in 
American public life without also taking into account the nature and 
positioning of the secular. They are a conceptual pair, and exploring 
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them in tandem is necessitated by the growing recognition of their 
deeply tangled relationship.7 We are now in a period of considerable 
flux and conflict regarding how to think about their relationship and 
how to embody it within the institutional spaces of our collective lives. 
The United States is not the only site embroiled in such realignment. 
The public resurgence of religion, and its extensive politicization, has 
been a feature of politics in recent decades around the world, from Iran, 
to Turkey, to India. These religio-political movements have, nationally 
and globally, succeeded in disrupting the taken-for-granted dominance 
and legitimacy of secularism within public life.
My aim is to work toward a more adequate model for envisioning 
the public role of religion in American life by positioning it in relation-
ship to the two dominant discourses that compete for public attention. 
I want to explore the differing forms of secularism that inform these 
discourses, and their implications for the public role of religion. By 
recognizing more clearly how these discursive traditions operate in the 
public marketplace of ideas, we can gain some distance from them and 
open up space for thinking differently. I will first sketch out these two 
versions of secularism, considering some historical touchstones and 
contemporary expressions, and then consider their theoretical and nor-
mative adequacy. Essentially, I will argue that each offers a truncated, 
simplified picture of the religious/secular landscape in American life, 
past and present. Each fails, in different ways for different reasons, 
to adequately address the conundrum of making room for religion in 
a religiously plural, secular, democratic state. I will then turn to the 
2008 presidential election, which not only offers a window on the cross 
currents of our moment, but augurs a promising shift in the politics of 
religion. Barack Obama, who distances himself from both of the domi-
nant pictures, illuminates a different trajectory for negotiating the reli-
gion-secular divide in American life. In so doing he offers resources for 
a different kind of story about the place of religion in American public 
life, one that does justice to our better history.8
II. Variants of Secularism
Much of the power of secularism has come from its ability to present 
itself as a natural category that maps onto the world in an unproblem-
atic fashion. By defining itself against religion, which it aligns with the 
parochial and the private, secularism has positioned itself as a neutral 
space and discourse, that which is held in common, and so appropri-
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ately public, even universal. The challenges of religious movements 
worldwide to the avowed neutrality of secularism have prompted 
scrutiny of this discursive formation and generated work on the roots 
and varieties of secularism across time and place.9 We are now begin-
ning to see more clearly the way in which the categories of religion and 
the secular work in tandem to make possible the formation of modern 
selves and societies. This includes the secular nation-state operating 
in a global economic order as well as rhetorics of privacy, freedom, 
and natural self-interest that fashion a self suitable for inhabiting such 
an order. As Timothy Fitzgerald explains, “By constructing religion 
and religions, the imagined secular world of objects and markets as 
the result of the free association of natural individuals, has also been 
constructed.”10 From a quite different angle and genealogy that builds 
upon the Christian contrast between the worldly and the spiritual, the 
conceptual distinction between religion and the secular helps to sus-
tain the (always relative) independence and purity of religion. In short, 
rather than view the religion/secular classification as a universal tem-
plate that maps seamlessly onto the world, the multiple streams that 
flow into its formation and its cultural work in configuring our world 
have moved to center stage.
Political Scientist Elizabeth Hurd has called attention to two distinc-
tive traditions of Western secularism that align themselves differently 
with religion.11 She distinguishes between what she terms a laicist sec-
ularism and a Christian/Judeo-Christian secularism, a tradition that in 
at least one of its American trajectories has expanded from its narrowly 
Protestant roots to include Catholics and Jews during the course of its 
20th-century development. Her work is especially useful in illuminat-
ing the versions of secularism promoted in and through our dominant 
public discourses surrounding religion.
Laicist secularism (sometimes called aggressive secularism or strong 
secularism) represents one camp in the culture wars and clearly pow-
ers the rhetoric of “the new atheists.” Its lineage, however, is much 
older, rooted in the narrative of secularization that has played such 
a central role in the formation of the modern Western imaginary. In 
basic outline this is a story of progress that links modernization with 
the process through which religion is disentangled from the various 
domains of social life—from politics to economics to science—and 
located within its own private domain. It is a celebratory narrative that 
traces the emancipation of humanity from the tyranny of ecclesiastical 
authorities, from the darkness of superstition, and from the religious 
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violence that engulfed early modern Europe. In this telling, the privati-
zation of religion makes room for the emergence of secular modernity 
that is envisioned as the teleological movement toward greater peace, 
freedom, and enlightenment.
Laicist secularism is embedded within a narrative of separation 
that imagines an oppositional, clean, and fixed divide between secular 
domains and discourses and religion. Its legitimacy is rooted in the 
presumption that this divide that secures the separation of religion 
and politics can be readily and permanently drawn apart from dis-
putes within religion and politics. Secularism in this form, as Hurd 
notes, “presents itself as having risen above the messy debate over 
religion and politics, standing over and outside the melee in a neutral 
space of its own creation.”12 It is this very claim, though, that rings 
increasingly hollow in a world where the politics of secularism have 
become so heated and divisive, pointing to the inescapable conclusion 
that far from providing the neutral framework for disentangling reli-
gion and politics, laicist secularism is itself “located on the spectrum of 
theological politics.”13
The second tradition of secularism, reflecting accommodationist 
rather than separationist proclivities toward religion, envisions Chris-
tianity (and in one of its tributaries, Judeo-Christianity) as the his-
torical ground and civilizational context within which the distinction 
between religion and the secular is made. Although committed to the 
institutional separation of church and state, this tradition does not 
seek to limit the intersections of religion and politics. To the contrary, 
Christian values and practices are envisioned as the wellspring from 
which secular democratic institutions and values draw sustenance. 
This tradition envisions a continuum, if not fusion, between Christian 
and national identity and mission. It is this understanding that makes 
possible the interpretation of the United States on two registers simul-
taneously: a secular state within the international system of states and a 
nation with a divine mission to spread democracy and freedom.14
These two traditions of secularism are now colliding in American 
public life, with each side engaged in a seemingly winner-take-all bat-
tle to determine the public role of religion. Each side seeks to position 
itself as the guardian of America’s founding principles and historical 
trajectory, reading the other out of the historical record. Neither model 
for envisioning the place of religion in American public life can in 
isolation account for the interplay of religion and secular and national 
Civic Forum 2009
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discourses and practices, and neither provides a compass for moving 
forward.
The tradition of laicist secularism resonates with the separationist 
logic and Enlightenment voices that, in collaboration with religious 
dissenters, gave shape to the American model of church/state separa-
tion. However, the term “secularism” was not used by the framers, and 
only came into usage as a political movement and distinctive theory 
of life in England in the mid-19th century.15 In the United States it 
was not until the late 19th century, and accelerating rapidly in the 
20th, that this version of secularism came to dominate, particularly 
among the educated elite. The universities were one of the primary 
sites for its incubation and transmission.16 Over a couple of decades 
the broadly Christian assumptions that shaped higher education in the 
United States, and sustained a unitary vision of truth, gave way to a 
more specialized disciplinary landscape embodying a new paradigm 
of knowledge that separated facts from values. This shift, as Christian 
Smith describes it, was part of a broader “secular revolution” in Amer-
ican life carried out by a cadre of elites “who were largely skeptical, 
freethinking, agnostic, atheist, or theologically liberal; who were well 
educated and socially located mainly in knowledge-production occu-
pations; and who generally espoused materialism, naturalism, positiv-
ism and the privatization or extinction of religion.”17 For the most part, 
this tradition of secularism in the American setting avoided outright 
hostility to religion and settled comfortably into a liberal embrace of a 
secular public sphere and private religious faith.
If higher education was at the forefront in effecting this social trans-
formation, the courts were critical in its further solidification, particu-
larly in the post-World War II period. It was a 1947 Supreme Court 
decision that invoked the metaphor of the “wall of separation” between 
church and state, quoting from an 1802 letter of Thomas Jefferson to 
the Danbury Baptist Association. This was the first in a series of judi-
cial rulings that pushed a more separationist agenda between govern-
ment and religion, with the public schools at the epicenter of the shift. 
Legal scholar Noah Feldman notes that this shift “could never have 
won at the polls,” but it “could become the consensus among educated 
elites who looked on their opponents as regressive and insufficiently 
attuned to the rights of minorities. To embrace legal secularism was, 
for the Court, continuous with a set of liberal values characteristic of 
enlightened citizens and educated jurists.”18
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It was this tradition of secularism that John F. Kennedy invoked in 
the 1960 presidential campaign in his famous speech seeking to defuse 
the political liabilities of his Catholic faith. He had to counter a long 
history of prejudice against Catholics who were suspected of being 
not American enough and not democratic enough due to perceived 
loyalty and obedience to the Pope. Kennedy’s strategy was to insist 
that his faith was irrelevant to politics. As he forthrightly proclaimed, 
“I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is 
absolute.”19 Although anchored in the imperative to separate religious 
and civil authorities, this metaphor did considerably more work for 
Kennedy in terms of separating religion and politics more broadly. He 
moved readily between the constitutional and institutional separation 
of church and state to the much broader claim about the separation 
of religion and politics. Religion, Kennedy proclaimed, is an entirely 
“private affair” and irrelevant to what he repeatedly referred to as the 
“real” issues of political life, such as hunger, poverty, and education.
A map picturing a neatly divided secular public versus private religion 
landscape became the dominant paradigm in the social sciences in 
the middle decades of the 20th century. Reading the history of Ameri-
can democracy through this paradigm contributed to generations of 
scholarship that essentially screened out the religious, primarily Prot-
estant, strands shaping American identity, law, and politics.20 So too 
with foreign policy analysts and international relations scholars who, 
imagining religion as private or epiphenomenal, were surprised and 
theoretically unprepared to account for its resurgence and politiciza-
tion in international and global affairs.21 Taking the wall of separation 
as the defining metaphor and script for the relationship of religion, 
national identity, and politics more broadly has blinded us to their col-
lusions and fusions in American life. In so doing, we essentially take 
one strand of a thicker rope and assume it can stand in for the whole. 
We lose sight of what has sometimes been called “voluntary estab-
lishments,” no doubt too innocent a term to capture the coercive and 
exclusionary dimensions that flow from them.
Alexis de Tocqueville, a 19th-century Frenchman, zeroed in on this 
truth about the place of religion in American life in his frequently cited 
Democracy in America. Famously remarking that religion in America is 
the “first of their political institutions,” that it “reigns without obstacles, 
by universal consent,” he called attention to the deep and pervasive 
influence of Protestantism in American life that continued despite, even 
because of, its formal legal disestablishment.22 When the country was 
Civic Forum 2009
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founded, more than 95% of the Euro-American population was Protes-
tant, with over 90% from the Reformed tradition.23 This religio-cultural 
homogeneity ensured a tacitly shared set of assumptions, sensibilities, 
and practices, from individualism, to legalism, to Bible-centered reli-
gion. Remarking on the partnership between religion and politics, Toc-
queville observed, “Americans combine the notions of Christianity and 
of liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible to make them 
conceive the one without the other.”24 The institutional separation of 
church and state, as William Connelly puts it, worked “to soften sectar-
ian divisions between Christian sects while retaining the civilizational 
hegemony of Christianity in a larger sense.”25 Tocqueville saw in early 
19th-century America a continuity, even a fusion, between Protestant 
Christianity and American democratic political life. This was in strik-
ing contrast to his own country where the revolution pitted national, 
democratic, and enlightenment interests against the authoritarianism 
and power of the dominant Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, this hos-
tile encounter was the incubator for laicist secularism, making France 
its paradigmatic exemplar. The institutional separation of church and 
state did not signal or produce a clean separation between religion and 
national identity, mission, and politics, but a framework that fostered, 
as Hugh Heclo articulates it, “a twisting helix of reciprocal influences” 
between Christianity and American democracy.26
This interpretive angle opens up a very different picture of the reli-
gion/secular divide, bringing into focus their continuities, collusions, 
and fusions. Recent revisionist studies have illuminated this terrain. 
From abolition to the civil rights movement, from prohibition to the 
new war on drugs, religious voices and movements have been at the 
epicenter of the conflicts that have transformed American laws, prac-
tices, and institutions.27 As James Morone puts it, “the campaigns leave 
deep legacies: they lead us to rewrite laws, reinterpret the Constitution, 
reshape the political culture, and create new public agencies.”28 The 
secularist model that envisions a clean and settled division between the 
domains of religion and secular public life is a still portrait, frozen in 
time. What we need is a moving picture to capture the processes in and 
through which secular and religious formations are constituted and 
reconstituted. Failure to recognize this process blinds us to the ways in 
which secularism refracts the religious sensibilities and assumptions 
of the majority tradition. In fact, so concerned to counter this failure, 
some now prefer the term “protestant secularism” to make perfectly 
clear that secularism is not neutrality or the antithesis of religion.29
9
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We cannot really get a handle on the religious inflections and shifts 
in American national identity unless we escape from an oppositional 
model that imagines secular national identity over against religious 
identity. American identity and Protestant identity have been deeply 
tangled from the earliest days of the country’s founding. The historical 
record of prejudice and violence against Native Americans, or Mor-
mons, or Catholics, has reflected a deep sense that they are un-Ameri-
can, not one of “us.” The trajectory has certainly moved in the direction 
of broadening the American-Protestant linkage. By mid-20th-century, 
the Protestant mainstream was “widening into a triple mainstream” to 
include Catholics and Jews.30 Tellingly, the term “Judeo-Christianity” 
was invented as a way to construct a shared tradition and interfaith 
coalition for a country whose population had grown far more diverse 
since its origins. Despite this widening of the mainstream, Christianity 
retains its dominant position, and we continue to hear voices, such as 
a Donald Wildmon who explicitly, though now anxiously rather than 
triumphantly, reference a “Christian America.”
These two traditions of secularism, with their distinctive roots, 
champions, and implications for the public role of religion, jostle in 
complicated ways in contemporary American life. Consider that in the 
mid-1900s, when Kennedy was successfully appealing to an absolute 
wall of separation between religion and secular public life and politics, 
Congress was inserting “under God” into the Pledge of Allegiance, 
while the prophetically inspired civil rights movement was profoundly 
transforming the American landscape. Not only does this point to the 
tangled interactions (on occasion partnerships) of these divergent tra-
ditions of secularism, but it captures the varied ways in which religion 
can shape public life—sometimes serving a priestly function in sacral-
izing national identity and mission, and other times serving a pro-
phetic transformative function.
Focusing on these distinctive traditions of secularism and the place 
they each accord religion helps to locate us within our contemporary 
moment. Identifying their contours and some of their expressions helps 
us to see better some of the constraints and possibilities of our time. By 
working in, through, and against these secular formations that have 
shaped our past (and continue to shape our present), we can begin to 
more adequately envision and accommodate the role of religion in our 
pluralistic democracy.
Neither model or tradition of secularism serves us well as we move 
into this next century. Exposing the mythic distortions of the standard 
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secularization narrative is especially important at this historical junc-
ture. As I tried to show in this brief sketch, it does not capture the man-
ner in which religious voices and values have in fact shaped American 
life, including national identity and mission, and so offers a serious 
misreading. Consider its potential ramifications as Americans engage 
in the dubious process of exporting democracy around the world. 
Pushing the myth that American democracy is secular democracy, as 
if religious dimensions were truly privatized, is to export a vision that 
does not begin to capture the dynamics of our own history. It is a stun-
ning erasure of the religious dimension of democratizing movements 
in the United States, and so contributes to our imaginative failure to 
recognize democratic impulses in religious movements abroad, not to 
mention authoritarian, anti-democratic leanings that operate under the 
rubric of the secular. The misreading of the religion/secular boundary 
in American life also contributes to another form of erasure closer to 
home, blinding us to the way in which some religious sensibilities and 
values inform and align with secular discourses and practices more 
than others. These informal establishments allow an unmarked reli-
gion to dominate—without even being named—and at the same time 
marginalize different religious voices and formations.31
If laicist secularism can be faulted for its theoretical failure to reveal 
its religious inflections, it is also vulnerable to theological critique for 
privileging some forms of religion rather than others. Although por-
traying itself as a level playing field for all religious expressions, it is, 
as we have seen, more accommodating of some than of others. Those 
religious traditions that accentuate individual and private faith are 
especially at home within this secularist formation. In this vein many 
have rightly noted the easy fit with Christianity, especially Protes-
tant traditions, compared with, say, the conundrum of locating Native 
American traditions within the religion/secular framework. It is also 
important to recognize the way in which it flattens theological alterna-
tives, even within the Christian tradition. Suggesting that Christian-
ity can easily align itself within the private domain is to privilege a 
particular theological resolution to the relationship between Christian 
faith and the broader world. As H. Richard Niebuhr so clearly demon-
strated in his classic work Christianity and Culture, there are a variety of 
ways in the past two millennia in which Christians have worked out 
this problem, a problem that parallels the challenges we are dealing 
with here. A resolution that rests comfortably within a fixed separation 
between religion and the wider culture fails to embody the transforma-
11
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tive imperative that Christian faith, and the prophetic tradition more 
generally, have recognized.
The alternate tradition of Christian secularism envisions Christian-
ity as the cultural ground or bedrock that sustains the unifying values 
of democratic politics and national identity. Although this tradition 
has been more accommodating of religious expressions, the privileged 
role of Christianity has made it unequally so. In forging such a power-
ful link between religion, national identity, and mission, this tradition 
founders on the rocks of increasing religious pluralism in the United 
States. Its limitations grow even more apparent from a global perspec-
tive. The fusion of religious and political identity in this tradition of 
secularism, as Charles Taylor argues, goes beyond the national arena to 
shape civilizational identity: “the sense people have of the basic order 
by which they live” and which commonly provides a sense of “supe-
riority and goodness.”32 In so doing, it constitutes a modern variant of 
Christendom, with all of the dangers of that formation in global politics 
today. It sustains and fuels the highly misleading narrative of a “clash 
of civilizations” that rests upon notions of homogenous, bounded, and 
static cultures that are maintained and defended in opposition to the 
“other” without.
III. Religion and Politics in the Obama Era
The 2008 presidential election offers an illuminating angle into the 
changing fortunes of these traditions of secularism in contemporary 
American life.33 Through the prism of presidential campaigning and 
politics we can see these versions of secularism as more than disem-
bodied abstractions. They are discursive strategies that politicians pur-
sue in their appeals to the electorate. Whether the appeals are genuine, 
calculating, or some mixture of both, they provide a window into con-
temporary currents in American life, currents that politicians can never 
afford to stray too far from. Focusing on the 2008 election of Barack 
Obama is especially revealing for our topic. Obama’s vision of the 
role of religion in American public life does not sit easily within either 
tradition of secularism, although he is clearly working out his own 
position in light of and in relationship to them. In and through his 
criticisms and challenges, he gestures toward a distinctly different way 
of navigating the religion/secular divide. It is one, I shall argue, that 
offers a more promising way for envisioning and enacting the role of 
religion in our pluralist secular democracy. It is not that he is a trail-
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blazer, without precedents in American history. But he draws upon 
religious and cultural currents that have been largely eclipsed by the 
polarization of the culture wars. That he could be elected is a signal of 
a changing landscape and, we may hope, impatience with the reigning 
alternatives. Unlike most politicians, he offers more than the occasional 
scattered references to religion and its intersections with politics. In 
two best-selling books, speeches, and a series of revealing interviews, 
he sets forth a fairly robust picture of the appropriate place of religion 
in American public life.
Obama cast his presidential bid in terms of moving past the deep 
cultural divisions that have marked American life in the past few 
decades, including the division between a “religious America” and a 
“secular America.” Critical of the Republican Party’s exploitation of 
this divide to mobilize voters, he also chastises Democrats for hiding 
behind a version of secularism that imagines that religious faith and 
values are irrelevant in political and public life. He admits to being 
tempted by this “strategy of avoidance.” When his opponent in his 
first senate race said “Jesus Christ would not vote for Barack Obama,” 
his initial thought was that he was running to be Senator, not Minis-
ter, of Illinois.34 Reconsidering, he concluded that this secularist strat-
egy allowed conservatives to define authentic religion, and it failed to 
honor the appropriate role and place of religion in American democ-
racy. Not only are most Americans religious, but also “the majority of 
great reformers in American history,” he notes, “were not only moti-
vated by faith, but repeatedly used religious language to argue for 
their cause.”35
Although rejecting the separationst model that privatizes religion, 
Obama is even more dismissive of those who yoke American iden-
tity and democratic politics too tightly to a single religious tradition, 
whether Christianity or the newly invented Judeo-Christian tradition. 
This is a recurring refrain in his writings and speeches. As he remarks 
in a 1997 address, “Whatever we once were, we are no longer just a 
Christian nation.” This same point makes its way into his presiden-
tial inaugural address, when he claims our “patchwork heritage” as a 
strength: “We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hin-
dus—and nonbelievers.”36 This is a symbolically profound observa-
tion. Noteworthy, of course, is the prominent place accorded Muslims, 
an effort to counter their all-too-frequent demonization. Although 
Muslims have for centuries been seen as the menacing “other” in the 
formation of Western identity, this has been rekindled in the aftermath 
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of September 11, with revealing episodes during the campaign when 
charges that Obama was a Muslim were hurled as slurs. Also note-
worthy, and unprecedented, is his explicit embrace of nonbelievers as 
full members of the American community. This counters a long tradi-
tion in which religious identity (initially Protestantism, though slowly 
expanding) functions as a litmus test for national identity, and faith is 
assumed to be a prerequisite for a moral life.
Significantly, Obama’s insistent attention to the diversity of the 
American religious landscape does not stop with attention to the mul-
tiple traditions of belief and unbelief that inhabit it. Religious tradi-
tions themselves are highly diverse, and reflect theological strains that 
push in very different political and social directions. Even if all Ameri-
cans were Christian, he asks pointedly: “whose Christianity would we 
teach in the schools? James Dobson’s or Al Sharpton’s?…Or should we 
just stick to the Sermon on the Mount—a passage that is so radical that 
it’s doubtful that our Defense Department would survive its applica-
tion?”37 Attention to theological diversity is critical because it exposes 
the distortions that come from any bloc or wholesale appeal to a reli-
gion to ground identity.
Although Obama advocates cutting the cord between national 
identity and religion, features of the campaign and his inauguration 
reveal how tightly bound they remain. Consider, for example, the 
ready agreement of the candidates to accept the invitation of promi-
nent evangelical minister and author Rick Warren to participate in a 
nationally televised serial interview at his Saddleback Church, and 
to answer such questions as “what does it mean to you to trust in 
Christ?”38 That a conservative evangelical Protestant minister could 
broker such an event, CNN broadcast it, and the public not express 
outrage captures the ready alignment and blend of nation, state, and 
Christianity in 21st-century America. Or consider some of the rituals of 
the presidential inaugural ceremony that he chose to continue despite 
their symbolic tension with his vision. We have become so familiar 
with them that we fail to see their role in sustaining the religion-nation 
continuum. Just think of the tradition going back to our first president 
of taking the oath of office on the Bible, a practice, incidentally, that not 
all presidents followed. Or think of his decision to continue the tradi-
tion, going back to Franklin Roosevelt in 1937, of opening and closing 
prayers at the inauguration. Although his selection of Rick Warren 
and Glen Lowrey, an African-American civil rights leader, provided a 
measure of racial and political diversity, these two Protestant ministers 
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did not symbolize Obama’s vision of transcending the historic links of 
nation and Christianity. When the news broke, I was in a group that 
participated in an interesting thought experiment, trying (to no avail) 
to identify two names that would signal religious diversity adequately. 
Obama’s vision strains against the presidential inaugural rituals that 
work to sustain the alignment of religion and nation identity. As these 
strains intensify, I think we will see an end to prayers at presidential 
inaugurations.
Rejecting a version of secularism that quarantines religion in the pri-
vate domain, and one that takes Christianity as the privileged source of 
American identity and democratic values, Obama advances an alter-
native that envisions a more pluralistic interactive border between 
religions and the secular. This way of imagining the religion-secular 
divide is driven by both political and theological convictions. In other 
words, it is not simply a commitment to a pluralistic democratic secu-
lar politics that underlies this approach, but also a particular perspec-
tive on religion. Again we bump up against the fact that models for 
negotiating the relationship of religious and secular domains rely upon 
working out both sides of the equation. Whether one envisions conflict, 
fusion, or more pluralistic interactions between religion and the secu-
lar depends fundamentally on how one defines not just the secular, but 
religion as well. There are two currents that merge in Obama’s perspec-
tive on religion that contribute to the plural, interactionist model that 
he embraces: a sense of religion as personal spirituality, and the tradi-
tion of black liberation theology.
He stands within a liberal tradition of religion that is marked by 
inclusivity, antipathy to dogma and religious organizations, and an 
eclectic appreciation for diverse sources of moral and spiritual illumi-
nation. He has, as he puts it, a “polyglot” background, acknowledging 
a wide variety of influences across religious traditions, cultures, and 
geographical regions, from Africa, to Indonesia, to Hawaii. Combined 
with his mother’s anthropological embrace of religious and cultural 
diversity, it has made him highly suspicious of religious dogmas or any 
claims to have a “monopoly on the truth.”39 His eclectic background 
convinces him that, “there are many paths to the same place.”40 This 
inclusive theological sensibility also impels him to embrace doubt as a 
welcome shadow of religious conviction, rather than its enemy. “Reli-
gion at its best,” he remarks, “comes with a big dose of doubt.”41 This is 
not an off-the-cuff comment, but a conviction that was featured on his 
official campaign website, with a prominently displayed quote by E.J. 
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Dionne, remarking that, “Obama offers the first faith testimony I have 
heard from any politician that speaks honestly about the uncertain-
ties of belief.” Expounding on this theme in a recent address, Obama 
explains that doubt should not replace faith, but it should “humble” us 
and “compel us to remain open, and curious, and eager to continue the 
moral and spiritual debate.”42
If his eclectic, personalist, critically reflective take on religion is 
one strand that accounts for his vision of the religion/secular divide, 
then his participation in the liberation traditions of the black church 
is another. It is a Christian faith shaped by the “particular attributes 
of the historically black church” that emerged out of its centuries-long 
struggle against slavery and racism. Because of this history, he claims, 
“the black church understands in an intimate way the Biblical call to 
feed the hungry and cloth the naked and challenge powers and prin-
cipalities.”43 This is not a spiritualized version of faith focusing only 
on belief, or personal experience, or the otherworldy—all variations 
that lend themselves to privatization. Nor is it an appeal to religion to 
ground national identity and values. He was drawn to this tradition, 
he claims, because of its power to “spur social change,” convincing 
him that faith is not a set of private beliefs or merely compensation 
for the pain and injustices of life, but “an active, palpable agent in the 
world.”44 It is, as he depicts it, a sense of relationship to all forms of life 
that carries the imperative to work towards the common good. This 
means, as he most frequently puts it, “we are our brother’s keeper, we 
are our sister’s keeper.”45
In Obama’s spiritual universe the distinction between religion and 
the secular is both powerfully affirmed, and yet also bridged. It is 
affirmed in and through a principled commitment to the constitutional 
separation of church and state, the decoupling of religion and national 
identity, and the democratic virtue of translating religious values and 
visions into a more universal language that fellow citizens within a 
diverse society can understand. But the boundary is hardly a high wall 
that separates and isolates religious faith from secular knowledge or 
the practices of the political and social world. In his words, “religious 
commitment did not require me to suspend critical thinking, disen-
gage from the battle for economic or social justice, or otherwise retreat 
from the world that I knew and loved.”46 This way of envisioning the 
religion-secular alignment is not laicist secularism or a Christian secu-
larism that asserts a rather static religious ground for national identity 
and the democratic project. It has the ingredients of a far more dynamic 
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and pluralistic engagement of religious and secular traditions within 
public space. These include a more fluid boundary between them, as 
well as a more inclusive, eclectic, and non-dogmatic take on religion. 
For some, the rubric of “spirituality” more adequately captures the 
form of religiosity that refuses some of the defining features of religion 
as conventionally understood. Evidence suggests this form of religion 
is on the rise, not just in Obama’s electability, but also in recent polls 
that track American attitudes to religion.47 The religious landscape is 
growing more diverse, Protestantism will soon be a minority religion, 
and the number of those identifying as unaffiliated or nonbelievers 
is among the fastest growing segment. There is, moreover, a striking 
fluidity across religious boundaries, as individuals increasingly shop 
the spiritual marketplace in their personal quest for a more tailor-made 
religion.
IV. Concluding Reflections
In working out the appropriate role of religion in American public life 
we are inevitably contending with the major currents that have been in 
play in recent decades. Both of the major streams have pushed a cap-
tivating but ultimately misleading picture of the opposition between 
religion and secularism. Escaping from this picture and recognizing 
the cross-fertilization across these currents is critical to fashioning a 
more constructive response to the place of religion in a religiously plu-
ral, democratic, secular state. The story of a secular America is as mis-
leading as a story of a Christian America, neither able to illuminate the 
interplay between the religious-secular divide in our nation’s history. 
The metaphor of a “double stranded helix” better captures the way 
in which religious, primarily Protestant, and secular democratic prin-
ciples have collaborated in shaping our past and present. Although an 
apt metaphor for an earlier time, our challenge today is to multiply 
the strands to make room for the greater diversity of voices among us. 
Moving in this direction requires the further decoupling of religion 
and national identity, the further de-privileging of Christianity—from 
presidential ceremonies to the practices and culture of the military—
and greater collective will to free electoral politics from mobilizations 
around religious identity.
Making room for this interplay reflects both democratic and theo-
logical convictions. To advance this model requires that we work both 
sides of the aisle, so to speak. It is necessary to counter the deeply 
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rooted assumption that secularism and democracy are so tightly linked 
that they necessarily demand the privatization of religion. Religious 
voices and perspectives are appropriate democratic expressions and 
oftentimes valuable moral resources for reflecting on matters of our 
common life. Their public role belongs within the sphere of civil soci-
ety, but not in relation to the symbols, practices, and institutions of the 
state, nation, and electoral politics. American Christians might imagine 
this as the disenfranchisement of Christianity, given its privileged role 
in our nation’s history—as a surrender to the religion of secularism. Yet 
I would argue, in the tradition of the 17th-century Protestant dissenter 
Roger Williams, that moving in this direction is essential to preserving 
the purity of the spiritual life from the corruptions of worldly affairs. 
Moving in this direction liberates Christian faith from its entangle-
ments with state and politics. American Christianity has too often 
played a priestly role in sacralizing the nation and its mission, rather 
than a prophetic role. Cutting its privileged ties to state and nation can 
unleash this prophetic power.
Developing a more interactive and pluralistic border zone between 
religions and secular discourses and practices is the further extension 
of a mediating tradition that can be traced back to a long line of Ameri-
can thinkers who sought to integrate the cross currents of religion, 
democracy, and science.48 The election of Barack Obama brings a spot-
light onto this tradition, and captures in his rhetoric and symbolically 
in his life story the globalizing impulses of this tradition that he may 
be peculiarly positioned to advance. This directional shift has become 
increasingly urgent. The colliding and mixing of cultures and identities 
has accelerated through new technologies and population migrations. 
Telling a better story about the dynamics of religion and American 
national identity and politics is not only important for purposes of 
American civic life but for cultivating a more cosmopolitan horizon 
within which to negotiate the multiple religious and secular traditions 
that jostle in the global public square.
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